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This paper analyzes the role and scope of macroprudential policy in preventing financial 
instability in the context of East Asian economies. It analyzes the behavior of the housing 
market in a dynamic setting to identify some of the factors responsible for the volatility of 
housing markets and their susceptibility to boom-bust cycles, which it identifies as a key 
source of financial imbalances in these economies. It then discusses the causal nexus 
between price and financial stability and the roles and complementary nature of 
macroprudential and monetary policies in addressing aggregate risk in the financial system. 
The paper identifies currency and maturity mismatches, which contributed to the 1997–1998 
Asian financial crisis, as ongoing concerns in these economies although the high levels of 
reserves in the region now act as a buffer. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Episodes of financial crises in both advanced and emerging economies over the past 
decade  and a half  leave little doubt that the stability of consumer prices does not 
necessarily ensure financial stability. Although there is no universally accepted definition 
and operational measure of financial stability, wide swings in asset prices and the 
boom–bust credit cycles during much of the great moderation era bear witness to the 
fact that price stability is not a sufficient condition for financial stability in either advanced 
or emerging economies. East Asia has been no exception. The prices of stocks and 
housing have displayed wide swings whereas consumer prices have remained relatively 
stable (as shown in the appendix). These divergent movements have cast doubt on the 
presumption that price stability would ensure stability of financial markets and 
institutions.  
In the run-up to the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis, the boom in the real estate markets 
in many emerging economies in Asia, which was fueled in part by capital inflows, 
resulted in increased financial imbalances that were manifested in soaring asset prices, 
a large increase in leverage in financial institutions and corporations, and deterioration of 
the currency and  maturity mismatches in the balance sheets of banks and other 
nonbank financial institutions. The cumulative effects of these imbalances eventually 
touched off a financial meltdown. 
In the aftermath of the 1997–1998 crisis, East Asian economies—in particular those hit 
by the crisis—made concerted efforts to improve the efficiency and stability of their 
financial systems. Banks and other nonbank financial institutions strengthened risk 
management, improved governance, and fortified themselves with equity capital more 
than what is needed to meet the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) capital 
adequacy requirements. On the macroeconomic policy front, these countries have 
embraced more flexibility in managing the exchange rate system. To complement these 
reforms they have also amassed large foreign exchange reserves as insurance against 
future crises.  
However, ten  years after recovering from the Asian financial crisis, some of these 
countries fell victim to the 2008–2009 global economic crisis. As it turned out, they were 
as vulnerable to reserve currency liquidity shortages as they had been in 1997. When 
foreign lenders and investors liquidated their investments in domestic financial assets or 
refused to renew their loans to East Asian banks in the second half of 2008, countries 
such as the Republic of Korea (henceforth Korea) and Singapore had to seek a currency 
swap line with the United States (US) Federal Reserve to avoid a liquidity crisis.  
Most emerging economies in East Asia are yet to develop policy instruments effective in 
sustaining financial stability. In countries adopting inflation targeting as the framework of 
monetary policy, the main tool used, the policy rate, is largely tied up with anchoring 
expectations on the future rate of inflation. Fiscal policy, on the other hand, is mostly 
reserved for countercyclical aggregate demand management. In realization of the limited 
scope of monetary and fiscal policy for securing financial stability, the BIS is advocating 
the use of “macroprudential” policy—a recalibration of “microprudential” regulations for 
macroeconomic purposes—as a means of safeguarding economies against the 
accumulation of financial imbalances. 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the role and scope of macroprudential policy in 
controlling the behavior of financial institutions in managing assets and liabilities and ADBI Working Paper 284      Park                                       
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market failures that render the financial system vulnerable to periodic crises in the 
context of the East Asian economy. For this purpose, this paper identifies two major 
sources of financial instability that have plagued many East Asian emerging 
economies—speculation and the boom–bust cycle in the housing market as a 
representative of real property markets, and the balance sheet mismatches of currency 
and maturity at banks and other financial institutions, which were at the top of the list of 
financial frailties of East Asia’s emerging economies at the time of the Asian financial 
crisis.  
Section 2 discusses the causal nexus between price and financial stability and the role 
and complementary nature of macroprudential policy in addressing systemic risk that the 
financial system is exposed to at any point in time and over the business cycle. Section 
3 analyzes the behavior of the housing market in a dynamic setting to identify some of 
the factors responsible for its volatility and susceptibility to the boom–bust cycle. Section 
4 attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of macroprudential policy in leaning against the 
boom–bust cycle in the real property market. Section 5 is devoted to an examination of 
the causes and consequences of the currency and maturity mismatches as a source of 
financial instability in a cross-sectional dimension. This is followed in section 6 by an 
assessment of the effectiveness of macroprudential policy in addressing the systemic 
risk that the twin balance sheet imbalances could give rise to. Concluding remarks are in 
a final section. 
2.  FINANCIAL INSTABILITY IN A LOW-INFLATION 
ENVIRONMENT, SYSTEMIC RISK, AND 
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY 
2.1  Why is Price Stability not enough? 
Before a series of financial crises wreaked havoc on a number of emerging economies 
in Asia and other parts of the world in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the dominant view 
had been that financial stability, however defined, was predicated on price stability 
(Schwartz 1995).
1
Since the early 2000s, however, this view has been regarded with growing skepticism as 
it has become evident that financial imbalances in the form of the boom and bust, 
excessive leverage in financial institutions and households, and deterioration in maturity 
and currency mismatches in the balance sheets of banks and other financial institutions 
could build up in a non-inflationary environment. In addition, the unwinding of these 
imbalances could destabilize the financial system and even trigger a financial crisis. 
 Examining the history of financial instability in the US from 1789 to 
1996, together with the experiences of the United Kingdom and Canada, Bordo and 
Wheelock (1998) agreed with Schwartz by saying that a monetary policy that focuses on 
limiting fluctuations in the price level would tend to promote financial stability.  
In describing the divergence between price and financial stability, a series of papers 
published by the staff of the BIS have coined a new term, known as the “paradox of 
financial instability,” in which “the financial system looks strongest when it is most fragile” 
                                                 
1 According to Schwartz (1995), one of the major causes of financial instability is fluctuations in the inflation 
rate which tend to amplify the uncertainty in estimating the potential real returns on investments and most 
severe episodes of instability occurred typically in disinflationary environments. ADBI Working Paper 284      Park                                       
5 
 
(Borio and Drehmann 2009).
2
During the past two decades of the great moderation a low and stable rate of inflation in 
an environment of greater predictability of economic policy fostered a false sense of 
safety and complacency with regard to financial stability. Together with a lower cost of 
borrowing brought about by price stability, this feeling of security led to a fall in the 
aversion to risk taking, which in turn resulted in excessive leverage in financial 
institutions and households. When combined with “procyclicality” of lending at banks and 
other financial institutions, the greater appetite for risk culminated in a high degree of 
volatility of prices and the boom–bust cycle in real and financial asset markets. 
 Borio and White (2004) ask, for instance, “Why has the full 
peace dividend of the war against inflation ostensibly not materialized?” Caruana (2010) 
claims that the 2008–2009 crisis is another episode proving that achieving stability of 
consumer prices through monetary policy is not enough to ensure financial stability. 
What is then the causal nexus between price and financial stability? 
A low rate of inflation may not necessarily guarantee financial stability, but a high rate of 
inflation may coincide with falling asset prices, as shown in section 4.3 This means that 
effectiveness of policies for financial stability would hinge on a clear understanding and 
empirical identification of the nexus between price and financial stability. But such 
identification has been complicated by the difficulty of defining and measuring financial 
stability. There is no general agreement on an operational definition of financial stability 
that is appropriate and fit for policy purposes. Unlike price stability, which can be 
represented in terms of a price index, financial stability defies such precise 
measurement. For the purpose of this paper it would suffice to use a definition described 
in a qualitative term, such as the stability of key financial institutions and markets.
3
2.2  Systemic Risk and Macroprudential Policy 
 
According to a Committee on the Financial System (CGFS) paper ( BIS 2010), systemic 
risk is “a risk of disruption to financial services that is caused by an impairment of all or 
parts of the financial system and has the potential to have serious negative 
consequences for the real economy(Page 2).” Borio (2009) and Hannoun (2010) identify 
two types of disruption that could cause the accumulation of financial imbalances. One 
type is financial cycle—the procyclicality over the business cycle in lending at banks and 
other nonbank financial institutions. Another type is cross-dimensional disruption arising 
from direct exposure of financial institutions to a set of common shocks or risk factors, as 
in the case of holding the same or similar assets, or indirect exposure through network 
links, as in the case of assuming counterparty risks.
4
Although monetary policy should be an integral component of any policy framework for 
managing systemic risk, it has its limitations, in particular when consumer and asset 
prices move in the opposite directions. In economies adopting inflation targeting, the 
policy rate is not an efficient tool to restrain excessive leverage and risk taking. For 
`example, a higher policy rate may be able to stabilize high asset prices, but when 
speculation sets in it is likely to do so at the cost of a larger output gap if consumer price 
 
                                                 
2 See Borio and Lowe (2002), Borio and White (2004), White (2006), Borio and Shim (2007), and Caruana 
(2010). 
3 Other definitions include one by the European Central Bank (ECB), which defines financial stability as "a 
condition whereby the financial system is able to withstand shocks without giving way to cumulative 
processes, which impair the allocation of savings to investment opportunities and the processing of 
payments in the economy” (Padoa-Schioppa 2003). 
4 See Crockett (2000), Borio (2003), and White (2004) on the procyclicality of lending. ADBI Working Paper 284      Park                                       
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inflation is below the target rate (Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia, and Mauro 2010). This 
limitation has aroused interest in, and brought on, efforts to develop and refine 
macroprudential policy as a means of managing excessive leverage, procyclicality in 
bank lending, and real and financial asset speculation. 
Macroprudential policy is defined as “the use of prudential tools with the explicit objective 
of promoting the stability of the financial system as a whole, not necessarily of the 
individual institutions within it” (Clement 2010). To be more specific, macroprudential 
policy has two objectives: one is to mitigate the financial cycle or procyclicality over time, 
and the other is to make the financial system more resilient given the cycle by 
moderating systemic risk caused by “interlinkages between the common exposures of all 
financial institutions” at a point in time (CGFS 2010; Hannoun 2010). To be sure, the 
objectives are not mutually exclusive, as greater financial system resilience would 
enable the system to better lean against financial cycles. 
A large number of microprudential instruments could be recalibrated for macroeconomic 
objectives of sustaining financial stability.
5These tools are basically designed and 
implemented to limit the distress of individual financial institutions, but Hannoun (2010) 
argues that they could be utilized to mitigate systemic risk as they can complement the 
instruments of monetary policy. Some of the instruments that may be used to strengthen 
financial system resilience include capital and liquidity requirements and restrictions on 
leverage in particular types of lending and currency mismatches. In particular, regulatory 
authorities may separate out vital requirements to reflect their potential threat to the 
stability of the financial system (Borio 2009).
6
A host of microprudential tools may also be reoriented to help lessen procyclicality. They 
include countercyclical capital charges, forward-looking provisioning for loan losses, 
capital conservation rules for banks that ensure prudent profit retention, the loan–to-
value ratio, the repayment period, margin requirements, capital requirements against 
real estate lending, and the countercyclical adjustment of exposure to the real estate 




It should be noted that the preceding categorization is based on broad correspondence 
between the instruments and the two objectives of macroprudential policy, as some of 
these instruments, such as the loan–to-value ratio, can improve the resilience of the 
financial system but also serve as an automatic stabilizer for the system (CGFS 2010). 
 These tools could be adjusted frequently and quantitatively. 
In controlling systemic risk over, and at a point in time in, a cross-sectional dimension, 
how does macroprudential policy work? How effective is it? Is it independent or 
                                                 
5 CGFS (2010) and Hannoun (2010) provide a list of these instruments categorized by the disruptions to the 
financial system they constrain. CGFS (2010) discusses how to design macroprudential frameworks and 
reviews experience in a range of countries. 
6 Borio (2009) proposed a top-down approach in employing prudential tools in which the contribution of each 
institution to systemwide risk in calculated. On the basis of this information, higher standards are imposed 
on institutions with a larger contribution.  
7 These instruments can be complemented by dynamic provisioning, but with caution. This is because the 
dynamic provisioning scheme may have an inherent bias against small and medium-sized firms and 
households, which have increasingly accounted for a large share of customers at banks. Large firms have 
access to international as well as domestic capital markets for the financing of their investment. Denied 
credit at banks, they could issue commercial paper, bonds, and equities to raise funds they need. These 
financing alternatives are often not available to small and medium-sized firms. During an economic boom, 
dynamic provisioning may discriminate against small and medium-sized firms, which are likely to be 
perceived as high-risk clients. ADBI Working Paper 284      Park                                       
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complementary to monetary policy? To answer these questions, in the following two 
sections this paper first identifies two sources of financial instability in East Asia. One is 
the real asset market boom–bust cycle, and the other is the currency and maturity 
mismatches in the balance sheets of banks and other financial institutions. The causes 
of these two sources of instability will then be examined to evaluate the scope and 
effectiveness of macroprudential policy in controlling the risks they present. Section 3 
analyzes the structural characteristics of the housing market, and the dynamics of 
bubbles in it.
8
3.  BOOM–BUST CYCLE IN REAL PROPERTY MARKETS 
AND EFFECTIVENESS OF MACROPRUDENTIAL 
POLICY 
 The twin mismatches are taken up in section 4. 
The two episodes of financial crisis in the past decade and a half have presented 
growing evidence that the markets for real properties and equities are prone to 
speculation and bubbles and that this susceptibility has been one of the most damaging 
frailties of East Asia’s financial system.
9
3.1  Characteristics of the Real Estate Market 
 In the run-up to the 1997–1998 Asian financial 
crisis, excessive investment exceeding the average in housing and other types of real 
estate, much of which was financed by foreign capital inflows, set off real asset 
speculation. The subsequent boom fed into bubbles, which eventually burst, deepening 
and exacerbating the management of the crisis. In the past few years, the People’s 
Republic of China, Singapore, and Hong Kong, China have witnessed soaring prices of 
housing, which is seen as a sign of new speculative bubbles in the making. These past 
and current developments in the housing market provide an interesting case for 
examining the causes and consequences of, and the effectiveness of, macroprudential 
policy in safeguarding against financial instability in emerging East Asia. 
Real estate includes land, residential housing, and a variety of commercial real estate. 
Although housing and other types of real estate have traditionally served as investment 
vehicles for wealth accumulation, many households and firms hold them for their 
services rather than for portfolio investment.
10
The heterogeneity and market segmentation suggest that different classes of real estate 
are likely to be poor substitutes for one another and for financial assets. As a result, the 
price of each class of real estate is largely determined by its supply and demand and is 
mostly unaffected by changes in the prices of other types of real and financial assets. 
 The absence of a standard unit of real 
estate hampers market transactions, and largely for these reasons the markets for land, 
housing, and commercial real estate are heterogeneous, illiquid, and segmented.  
                                                 
8 For a more rigorous analysis of the procyclicality in Korea’s real estate market, see Park and Wyplosz 
(2008). 
9 According to Glindro, Subhanji, Szeto, and Zhu (2008), speculation in the housing market is considered to 
be one of the major sources of financial imbalance that pose systemic risks to these economies. Zhu 
(2006) also points to booms and busts in the real estate market as having played a crucial role in 
triggering and worsening the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis. 
10 In many East Asian emerging economies that have suffered from high and unpredictable inflation, housing 
has been one of the most sought-after assets for wealth accumulation. In Korea, for example, the total 
market value of housing was estimated to be three times larger than gross domestic product (GDP) in 
2006. ADBI Working Paper 284      Park                                       
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These features may provide rationale for the policy authorities to intervene in these 
markets when they see signs of speculation. They could do this by invoking 
microprudential regulations to curtail bank financing for real estate investment and 
taxation on property transactions rather than changing the stance of macroeconomic 
policies such as monetary policy.  
3.2  Substituting Housing for Financial Assets 
Before the onset of financial liberalization that began in the early 1980s and which has 
spurred the expansion and diversification of housing finance, there was no unified 
national housing market in East Asia’s emerging economies. In fact, there were many 
heterogeneous housing markets segmented by region and differentiated by housing 
type. With the continuing expansion and diversification of the housing financial system, 
however, these segmented markets have increasingly been integrated into a unified 
national housing market that is large and liquid in many East Asian emerging 
economies. This market integration has been instrumental in lowering transaction costs 
and increasing market liquidity, which have in turn made housing a tradable asset and 
good substitute for financial assets.  
As a result, housing demand has become more sensitive to changes in macroeconomic 
variables, such as the prices of bonds and equities and the exchange rate. Zhu (2006) 
finds a strong positive relationship between prices of real estate and those of equities, 
suggesting that in countries with a well-developed and efficient mortgage market the two 
assets are likely to be good substitutes for each other.
11
For an analysis of the dynamics of housing market speculation, it is convenient to divide 
buyers of housing into two different types. The first type includes those buyers coming 
into the market for consumption of housing services, and the second are speculative 
investors. Buyers in the first category rent the houses they purchase to themselves; 
many of them do not speculate on housing prices. Buyers in the second group are those 
investing in housing as an asset for capital gains; they are mostly speculators. 
 The same study also provides 
evidence that changes in the exchange rate have a significant impact on housing prices 
in countries that adopt flexible exchange rate systems where currency appreciation is 
associated with a housing boom and depreciation with a market contraction. It is also 
seen that during the boom period foreign investors move heavily into East Asian 
property markets and retreat en masse when a downturn begins, as they did during the 
1997–1998 Asian financial crisis. 
On the supply side, the availability of housing consists of existing houses on the market 
for sale and inventory of newly built houses. Since it takes time to build new houses and 
most house owners are not likely to put up their houses for sale in response to a housing 
market boom, the supply of housing tends to be insensitive to changes in house prices in 
the short run. An exogenous increase in demand therefore does not elicit much of a 
supply response and is therefore likely to raise prices in the housing market more than it 
would in other financial markets, suggesting that much of the market clearing takes 
place through price changes. 
 
                                                 
11 See also Borio and McGuire (2004) for strong links between equity price and house price movements. ADBI Working Paper 284      Park                                       
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3.3  Financial Accelerator and Extrapolative Expectations in the 
Housing Market  
When there exists a well-developed housing finance system, investments in housing are 
mostly financed by loans originated by banks and other mortgage lenders for which real 
estate properties are pledged as collateral. Therefore, larger availability and 
diversification of housing finance would result in an increase in the positive correlation 
between housing prices and the supply of bank credit. This correlation establishes a 
strong link between the housing price and bank credit cycles.12 This link then activates 
the financial accelerator mechanism that could put the housing price on an implosive 
path to create a bubble.
13
The collateral value of houses increases with the higher prices of housing. This increase 
allows housing investors to secure more mortgage loans with more favorable terms than 
before. That is, the rise in house prices lowers the cost and increases the availability of 
mortgage credit to house buyers as their financial positions measured by their house 
collateral values improve. The borrowers in the first category may then be able to extract 
additional equity to finance their next house, and for the same reason speculative buyers 
will be able to purchase more houses. Because of these secondary and cumulative 
effects of the increase in housing finance and demand, housing prices continue to soar 
in a housing boom.  
  
When the financial accelerator mechanism is set in motion, changes in current housing 
prices are likely to be determined by their previous changes in addition to the deviations 
from the fundamental housing values and the contemporaneous adjustment to changes 
in the fundamentals. That is, an initial price increase induces an additional demand for 
housing for investment purposes as it generates an expectation of a continuous increase 
in housing prices to attract speculative buyers, pushing up the house prices further and 
thereby setting off a price dynamics that could build a bubble. The financial accelerator 
mechanism may then explain why investors in the housing market are likely to be guided 
by an extrapolative expectation. 
4.  THE ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESSOF 
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY IN STABILIZINGTHE 
HOUSING MARKET  
To discuss the scope and effectiveness of macroprudential policy in leaning against 
financial cycles, this section considers a situation in which consumer prices are not 
expected to rise beyond a target range but there are signs of incipient speculation that 
may create a bubble in the housing market. Faced with growing instability in the housing 
market, the central bank could increase the policy rate to suppress unwarranted high 
expectations of capital gains, but would be reluctant to do so unless the speculation was 
likely to increase inflationary pressure. Fiscal authorities may raise the property tax rate 
and impose additional taxes on the transactions in, and transfer of, properties but these 
types of taxation may not be desirable as they distort property markets and impair their 
efficiency.  
                                                 
12 Zhu (2006) finds that bank credit is positively related to house prices in all countries he examines. 
13 On the financial accelerator, see Bernanke (2007). ADBI Working Paper 284      Park                                       
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As a third alternative policy measure, financial regulatory authorities may consider 
imposing microprudential regulations on mortgage lending at banks and other nonbank 
financial intermediaries for the macroeconomic purpose of stabilizing the housing 
market. In this regard, regulatory authorities could employ two types of macroprudential 
instruments. The first includes some of the microprudential instruments—such as the 
loan–to-value and debt–to-income ratios, which are adjusted to control the supply of 
credit to a particular sector such as housing. The second type comprises those tools for 
controlling the supply of aggregate bank credit such as countercyclical capital charges, 
dynamic loan-loss provisioning, and capital conservation rules for banks. These tools are 
mostly implemented to moderate procyclicality in bank lending. Implementation of these 
two types of instruments entails quantitative—rather than price—control of the 
availability of sector as well as aggregate bank credit. 
4.1  Fungibility of Money: Ineffectiveness of Selective Credit 
Control 
In an effort to stave off a housing market boom, suppose that the regulatory authorities 
lower the two microprudential ratios—the loan-to–value and debt-to–income ratios—and 
that there is no change in monetary policy. The squeeze on mortgage lending is likely to 
discourage borrowing for consumption demand (the  purchases of houses for their 
services) but not necessarily borrowing for investment demand by those seeking higher 
capital gains if housing prices are expected to rise continuously. Under these 
circumstances, as long as the level of total bank lending is left unchanged, banks will be 
able to extend more of other types of business and consumer loans with the funds 
released from curtailed housing finance. But if the expected real return on housing 
investment is perceived to be higher than the returns on other assets, many of the 
borrowers taking out other nonmortgage bank loans are likely to invest the bulk of their 
loan proceeds in housing.
14
Given the fungibility of money, it appears that, in countries where housing has become a 
good substitute for financial assets and banks dominate financial intermediation and the 
financial system as a whole, restrictions on mortgage lending alone may not be effective 
in preventing a housing market bubble; they need to be complemented by an overall 
cutback of aggregate bank credit through, for instance, an increase in loan-loss 
provisioning. But once housing speculation gathers force (as shown by the Korean 
experience discussed in section 4.3), even the simultaneous squeeze on both the sector 
and aggregate supply of bank credit may not be effective. This is because, despite the 
overall tightening of bank credit, some of the loans extended to non-housing borrowers 
could be drawn away to be invested in housing as long as real property speculation 
picks up speed.  
 This results from the fungibility of money and imperfections 
in ex-post loan use monitoring that may not be able to prevent the loan diversion. 
4.2  Macroprudential and Monetary Policy: Are They 
Independent? 
In the preceding discussion, tightening of macroprudential policy is likely to move banks 
to raise interest rates on their loans. It will also drive many of their loan customers out of 
                                                 
14 A housing market boom often coincides with land speculation. Business borrowers may decide to use a 
fixed investment loan to build a plant on a larger site of land than otherwise. ADBI Working Paper 284      Park                                       
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the bank loan market and into money and capital markets for direct financing at a higher 
cost. This increase in debt and equity financing will then increase market interest rates. If 
this happens, contractionary macroprudential policy will dampen the aggregate demand 
for goods and services (with a possible exception of construction investment) as many 
potential borrowers without access to the capital market will drop out of the bank loan 
market, while it has limited effects on suppressing housing market speculation. The 
tighter stance of macroprudential policy may therefore widen the output gap, depending 
on the extent to which bank loans are shifted to housing finance. Macroprudential 
measures may strengthen the financial system but do not necessarily enhance financial 
macroeconomic stability. It follows then that if the policy rate is a poor tool to deal with 
financial market instability so are macroprudential measures poor tools for moderating 
financial cycles. 
The preceding discussion raises an important question as to whether the division of 
labor in policy management, in which the central bank follows an interest rate rule in 
conducting monetary policy for price stability while regulatory authorities are engaged in 
quantitative control in managing macroprudential policy for financial stability, is a viable 
institutional arrangement.  
This question arises because most of the macroprudential instruments leaning against 
financial cycles work through changes in the availability of sector and aggregate credit 
and in this respect are similar to reserve requirements. That is, macroprudential tools 
operate through effects on bank lending—changes in bank loans cause investment and 
consumer spending to change. Since this bank lending channel is one of many channels 
of monetary policy, it follows that, in emerging economies where the banking system 
dominates financial intermediation, as far as the channel of transmission is concerned, 
macroprudential policy geared to controlling procyclicality in bank lending and monetary 
policy targeted on price stability are one and the same, although they have different 
objectives. 
4.3  Korea’s Experience with Macroprudential Policy 
A recent survey by the BIS on the use of macroprudential instruments in 33 countries 
shows that in most cases the objective was to enhance the resilience of the financial 
system rather than moderate financial cycles and that the evidence on the effectiveness 
of macroprudential measures is not conclusive (CGFS 2010). In part these findings are 
supported by the recent experience with managing the real estate boom in Korea. Over 
a 7-year period beginning in 2001, the Government of Korea tightened monetary policy 
and imposed various macroprudential and tax measures on 12 occasions to break off an 
impending period of real estate speculation. 
In October 2003, the government not only increased the policy rate but also lowered the 
loan–to-value ratio to 40% from 60% on mortgage loans with maturities of less than ten 
years for apartment purchases.
15
                                                 
15 In Korea there is a liquid market for apartments, which are standardized in terms of size and are actively 
traded. In particular, smaller apartments are easily marketable, making them a tradable investment asset 
and a good substitute for financial assets. 
 But the loan–to-value ratio control turned out to be less 
than effective because of leakage—banks were able, and in fact started, to extend 
mortgage loans with maturities longer than ten years to avoid the restriction. To plug this 
loophole, two years later mortgage lending was tightened further by lowering the loan–
value ratio on those loans with maturities longer than ten years for the purchase of an ADBI Working Paper 284      Park                                       
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apartment valued at more than W600 million (approximately US$600,000). At the same 
time the debt–to-income ratio was lowered to below 40% for apartment financing in 
some of the districts of the Seoul metropolitan area where there were signs of real estate 
speculation, and in 2009 this restriction was extended to the entire Seoul metropolitan 
area.  
Despite the implementation of these macroprudential measures, housing speculation did 
not subside. It was clear that stronger doses of antispeculation measures were needed. 
These measures included the requirement for registration of and imposition of transfer 
and transaction taxes on properties, which eventually ended the boom in the housing 
market. In retrospect it is unclear whether the real estate speculation would have been 
brought under control if the government had not resorted to the tax and other direct 
control measures. It is difficult to examine empirically the extent to which the 20 
percentage point reduction in the loan–to-value ratio contributed to slowing down if not 
stopping the speculation. In retrospect it was more of a symbolic move on the part of the 
regulatory agency—the  Financial Supervisory Service (FSS)—to signal that it was 
serious about stabilizing expectations on future prices of apartments, although it is 
unclear as to how successful the signaling was.  
In general, the effectiveness of macroprudential tools may vary depending on the 
circumstances in which they are implemented. When the consumer price index (CPI) 
and asset prices move in the same direction, it is likely that the stance of both monetary 
and macroprudential policy would be the same—they reinforce each other to restore 
both price and asset market stability.
16
In particular, the conflict between the two policies appears to be more severe if rising 
consumer prices are accompanied by stagnation in the housing market, as shown by the 
recent experience in Korea. In August 2010 the central bank raised the policy rate as it 
was concerned about the buildup of inflationary pressure. At the same time, regulatory 
authorities lifted the  debt-to-–income ratio on specific mortgage loans to revive the 
sagging demand for housing loans. Although it is too early to judge, the higher debt–to-
income ratio did not seem to have elicited any positive housing market response.
 On the other hand, when movements of 
consumer and asset prices diverge, the two policies run into conflict with each other, as 
in the case of stable CPI and rising asset prices in section 4.  
17
Macroprudential tools such as the loan–to-value and debt–to-income ratios are rather 
inflexible instruments that cannot be fine-tuned frequently to alter price expectations in 
real property markets. Fungibility of money makes their effectiveness at best ambiguous. 
Macroprudential policy for controlling the quantity of aggregate credit needs to be 
coordinated with the conduct of monetary policy but, given the different policy objectives 
and approaches to policy management of the monetary and regulatory authorities, such 
coordination would be difficult to institutionalize.
   
18
                                                 
16 A recent BIS report (CGFS 2010) argues that the use of macroprudential policies targeting the real estate 
sector in Asian countries helped make banking systems more resilient to real estate downturns but did not 
make much difference to either the strength of the boom or the depth of the bust. 
 Financial regulatory authorities would 
find it difficult to decide on timing and the extent of adjustment of tools. For effective 
management of macroprudential policy, regulatory authorities should be able to detect 
signs of real asset speculation well before it gets out of control, and identify the turning 
17 During the first 7 months of 2010, consumer prices rose by about 1% whereas housing prices in some 
parts of the Seoul metropolitan area began to fall, beginning in the second quarter of 2010. 
18 The regulatory authorities may have not developed the expertise or culture of macroprudential policy, 
while the central bank cannot exercise supervisory control at the level of individual institutions. These 
institutional constraints could hamper coordination between the two policy authorities.  ADBI Working Paper 284      Park                                       
13 
 
points in cyclical developments in the economy. Equipping regulatory authorities with 
this macroeconomic forecasting function would mean entrusting them with a role in the 
conduct of monetary policy. It is not clear what that role should be. 
5.  CURRENCY AND MATURITY MISMATCHES AS A 
SOURCE OF FINANCIAL INSTABILITY
19
A second source of financial instability that has caused much anguish to many East 
Asian  emerging economies has been the propensity of financial institutions to hold 
assets and liabilities that are mismatched in terms of maturity and currency. The twin 
mismatches are a typical example of systemic risk in a cross-sectional dimension that 
many emerging economies are exposed to (please put footnote 19 here). When banks 
and other nonbank financial institutions hold long-term and low-liquidity assets, such as 
long-term loans (denominated in both domestic and foreign currency) funded by 
borrowing from both domestic and external wholesale  funding markets, they expose 
themselves to a liquidity and solvency crisis when market liquidity in both domestic and 
reserve currencies suddenly evaporates. If banks commit similar mismatches across the 
board, an external shock such as a sudden reversal in capital flows could endanger the 
safety of the entire financial system.  
 
During the 1997 Asian financial crisis, currency mismatches between foreign currency 
assets and liabilities in bank balance sheets were at the top of the list of financial 
vulnerabilities of Asian banks that exacerbated, if not triggered, the financial meltdown. A 
number of studies attribute their causes to the market failures associated with 
asymmetric information and moral hazard.
20
In the run-up to the 2008–2009 global economic crisis, it appears the currency mismatch 
of East Asian financial institutions was moderate compared to the massive deterioration 
that had taken place prior to the 1997–1998 crisis, although this may not be the case for 
the maturity mismatch. The 2008 global economic crisis has highlighted the gravity of 
the maturity mismatch as a major cause of the crisis, not only in emerging but also 
advanced economies.




 As shown in the following sub-section, in emerging economies 
with foreign currency liabilities, maturity mismatches create a more serious systemic risk 
as they are invariably accompanied by currency mismatches. The section discusses how 
the financial imbalances stemming from the twin mismatches arise and whether they 
could be mitigated through macroprudential policy. 
                                                 
19 This section draws on Park (2009). 
20 Goldstein and Turner (2004) argue that all prominent financial crises in emerging economies in the 1990s 
and the early 2000s share one striking characteristic—a large currency mismatch. See also Chang and 
Velasco (2000); Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999); and Rodrik and Velasco (1999). 
21 Brunnermeier et al. (2009) point out that one of the most critical lessons of the 2008–2009 crisis is that the 
maturity mismatch of short-term funding of long-term assets with potentially low market liquidity has been 
the main source of financial instability. ADBI Working Paper 284      Park                                       
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5.1  The Scale and Pervasiveness of Maturity and Currency 
Mismatches  
Goldstein and Turner (2004) constructed a measure of currency mismatch known as the 
aggregate effective currency mismatch (AECM).
22
Since then the situation has eased as the AECM has remained in positive territory in 
most countries, although, reflecting the decline in net foreign assets caused by the 2008 
global economic crisis, it slipped in all sample East Asian countries in 2008. The 
deterioration has been most pronounced in Korea—its AECM slid from 2005, turning into 
a negative figure in 2008 due to a sharp decline in capital inflows.  
 Figure 1 presents AECMs of Asia’s 
emerging economies. A negative number for the AECM, which results from a negative 
position on net foreign currency assets, indicates a high degree of mismatching. The 
estimates show that Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand had all erred on 
letting the currency mismatch deteriorate to a negative level before the 1997–1998 
crisis.  
















































































Notes: Recent figures provided by Phillip Turner at the BIS; PRC refers to People’s Republic of China 
Source: Goldstein and Turner (2004) 
                                                 
22 Goldstein and Turner (2004) define an aggregate effective currency mismatch (AECM) as follows: 
AECM = NFCA/XGS (FC/TD), where  
  NFCA = net foreign currency assets (+) or liabilities (-); 
  XGS = exports of goods and services (national income account), when NFCA is negative; 
  MGS = imports of goods and services (national income account), when NFCA is positive; and 




Even when the AECM is positive, as noted earlier a country could run into a financial 
crisis if reserve currency liquidity vanishes when it is exposed to a large maturity 
mismatch between foreign currency assets and liabilities. To be a useful predictor or an 
early warning indicator for a financial crisis, therefore, the AECM may need to be 
adjusted for the maturity mismatch. In the absence of the banking data needed for the 
construction of a measure of the maturity mismatch, Park (2010) examines as proxies 
changes in  the loan–deposit ratio and short-term foreign liabilities relative to foreign 
exchange reserves for a qualitative assessment of the extent of the mismatch. In 
general, a rise in the loan–deposit ratio indicates that banks rely more on both domestic 
and foreign wholesale market funding than on core deposits. This will cause an increase 
in the maturity mismatch.  
Similarly, an increase in short-term foreign liabilities relative to foreign exchange 
reserves is likely to aggravate the maturity mismatch since it means that banks secure 
more external funding from the short end of global financial markets. Here one could use 
the volume of total foreign liabilities rather than the level of foreign exchange reserves as 
a scale variable. However, the level of foreign exchange reserves provides additional 
information on a country’s vulnerability to liquidity crisis as the ratio of short-term foreign 
liabilities to foreign exchange reserves is often regarded as a barometer for an adequate 
amount of foreign exchange reserves to be held in emerging economies.  
Park (2010) shows that between 2000 and 2008 the loan–deposit ratios were stable and 
stayed well below 100% in most countries except for Korea and Thailand, where the 
ratios climbed up to 135% (Korea) and 105% (Thailand) in 2008. On the external liability 
side, short-term foreign liabilities as a proportion of foreign exchange reserves in some 
of the East Asian countries where data are available were well below the maximum level 
allowed for by the Greenspan–Guidotti–Fischer rule, which prescribes an amount of 
reserves equal to the country’s short-term foreign currency liabilities.  
The two ratios together with changes in the AECM suggest that all East Asian 
economies under review appeared to have been in a much stronger financial position 
than in 1997 to withstand and remain outside the danger zone of a currency crisis. 
During the fourth quarter of 2008, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, however, 
Korea came close to facing insolvency of many of its financial institutions. 
5.2  Causes of Twin Mismatches 
Regardless of their nationality, banks are open to maturity mismatching due to a number 
of inherent characteristics of bank intermediation. One such characteristic is the debt 
maturity transformation they are engaged in. Another is procyclicality in their lending and 
borrowing, and a third is relationship banking where banks establish long-term 
relationships with their loan customers. 
All banks, whether they are operating from advanced or emerging economies, earn a 
substantial share of their profits by borrowing from the short end of the financial market 
(as in the case of accepting short term deposits and issuing certificates of deposits CDs) 
and lending long (as in the case of financing long-term business investment in addition 
to short-term working capital).
23
                                                 
23 Brunnermeier et al. (2009) argue that there are many caveats to this generalization and that the mismatch 
is a matter of degree.  
 The maturity mismatch “reflects the underlying structure 
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of the economy in which individuals have a preference for liquidity but the most profitable 
investment opportunities take a long time to pay off. Banks are an efficient way of 
bridging the gap between the maturity structure embedded in the technology and 
liquidity preference”. (Allen and Gale 2007: 59)   
From the perspective of an individual bank, it would be reasonable to assume that, 
under normal circumstances, it would have an adequate deposit base and access to 
wholesale funding markets to finance its long-term loans and investments in securities. 
In fact, most banks would make the same assumption. Any temporary difficulties in 
short-term funding markets in domestic currency could easily be dealt with by the central 
bank. But dependence on foreign currency funding is quite different. When reserve 
currency liquidity dries up, the central bank can meet only a limited amount of the 
increase in the demand for reserve currency liquidity.  
To be sure, some of the individual banks may be able to avoid a liquidity crisis but the 
financial system as a whole cannot when it is faced with a sharp decrease in net capital 
inflows. Even when banks in emerging economies relend in reserve currencies, they 
may not be able to avoid a currency mismatch, because local borrowers include not only 
exporters with cash flows in dollars and euros but also borrowers from the nontradable 
sector for imports without them. 
As Turner (2010) points out, the massive aggregate dependence of non-US financial 
firms on wholesale short-term dollar funding markets created a major systemic risk in 
2008. When depositors left the banks en masse and liquidity in short-term funding 
markets disappeared rather suddenly, the entire banking sector of emerging economies 
suffered from severe US dollar liquidity shortages. In some countries, the liquidity crisis 
threatened the solvency of their banking industry. It should be noted that, unlike their 
counterparts from emerging economies, financial firms from reserve currency countries 
(the US and members of the European Monetary Union) engaged in cross-border 
financial intermediation are largely immune to such a liquidity shortage. 
In general, banks are relationship lenders. They nurture close long-term relationships 
with their loan customers, which helps overcome the asymmetry in information to 
improve the screening and monitoring process. Banks routinely roll over short- as well as 
long-term loans to those loan customers with a good credit standing. The banks also 
know that most of their loan customers are so accustomed to the loan rollover that they 
would not be prepared to repay their loans even when they are due, not to mention 
paying the loans back before they mature. Therefore, even when they are faced with 
liquidity shortages, banks would not consider refusing renewal of most of their household 
and business loans for fear of losing the loan customers with long-standing relationships 
until they exhaust all other options. 
Procyclicality over the business cycle is another characteristic of banking that 
exacerbates the twin mismatches. During the cyclical upturn, the yield curve gets 
steeper to create incentives for banks to rely more on short-term funding for the growing 
demand for their loans. In particular, banks may borrow more in volume and from the 
short end of international money markets if domestic interest rates are higher. As a 
result, both the maturity and currency mismatches deteriorate.  
When a cyclical downturn sets in, foreign investors unload their holdings of domestic 
securities and foreign banks refuse to renew their short-term loans at a time when 
domestic banks and other financial institutions find it increasingly difficult to recall their 
foreign currency loans extended to local customers or liquidate foreign currency assets 
they hold. A subsequent decline in net capital inflows exacerbates currency mismatching ADBI Working Paper 284      Park                                       
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and, depending upon the magnitude, the currency mismatch could provoke a reserve 
currency liquidity crisis.
24
During the downturn, the central bank is expected to loosen up monetary policy to 
prevent credit contraction. Although an expansionary monetary policy of cutting the 
policy rate is called for to forestall deflation, it could deepen the liquidity crisis as it 
weakens the currency and hence induces further capital outflows. Over the business 
cycle, there is a limit to which monetary policy can mitigate the increase in the twin 
mismatches. This limitation may provide the rationale for strengthening macroprudential 
policy in cooperation with monetary authorities but, as argued in the following section, its 
effectiveness remains unclear. 
 
6.  TWIN MISMATCHES AND MACROPRUDENTIAL 
POLICY 
6.1  Could Mismatches be Mitigated by Prudential Regulations? 
Goldstein and Turner (2004) propose restrictions such as imposing limits on net foreign 
exchange positions, foreign exchange liabilities, and bank holdings of securities 
denominated in foreign currencies. They also recommend introducing more restrictive 
rules for liquidity risk management and a higher reserve requirement on foreign currency 
deposits. Requirements on the ratio of foreign currency loans to deposits may be added 
to this list (Hannoun 2010).
25
A strict regulatory restriction designed to prevent currency mismatches would dictate that 
bank lending and debt contracts be made in the currencies in which deposits and foreign 
funding are denominated and in which borrowing customers earn revenues. In an 
extreme case, loans to local customers who earn only in a local currency should be 
excluded from banks’ foreign currency lending. Would such a regulatory restriction be 
efficient or, more importantly, enforceable?  
 In this section it is argued that these regulations could 
distort resource allocation and, in a crisis situation, they are likely to be ineffective, as 
the Korean experience shows. 
Such a regulation is not efficient because banks are likely to discriminate in foreign 
currency lending against those borrowers from the nontradable sector without foreign 
currency revenues. Compliance with the currency mismatch regulation would mean that 
banks would lend in foreign currency mostly to the borrowers from the tradable sector. If 
banks lend to firms in the nontradable sector they may charge a higher premium. 
Therefore, the regulation is likely to distort resource allocation and even retard the 
development of the nontradable sector. 
Is the regulation enforceable? To alleviate the twin mismatch problems, Korea’s financial 
supervisory service imposes a foreign currency liquidity regulation in which banks are 
                                                 
24 Capital flows in emerging markets tend to be procyclical, as shown by Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh 
(2004); Contessi, DePace, and Francis (2008); and Cardarelli, Elekdag, and Aythan Rose (2009). 
25In addition,  these regulatory restrictions may be complemented by other measures limiting maturity 
mismatching, such as (i) linking the class of assets for which short-term funding is secured to the maturity 
of the funding, e.g.,  restricting banks to holding  only short-term safe and liquid assets for short-term 
funding; and (ii) imposing a higher capital charge on financial institutions with funding liquidity risk 
stemming from holding long-term assets with low market liquidity funded by short-term liabilities 
(Brunnermeier et al. 2009). ADBI Working Paper 284      Park                                       
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required to relend in foreign currencies to local borrowers at least 85% of their foreign 
currency funds maturing within three months (15% for domestic currency loans). The 
maturity of the local foreign currency loans must also be less than three months. The 
financial supervisory service also enforces another liquidity restriction in which banks are 
required to keep the ratio of net short-term foreign currency assets maturing within 7 
days to total foreign currency assets at a positive level, and at more than –10% for 
assets maturing within less than 30 days. On their balance sheets banks do comply with 
these regulatory measures, but in reality they do not. Indeed, if these prudential 
measures had been observed to the letter, one might argue that Korea should have 
avoided the run on the central bank reserves during the fourth quarter of 2008, but it did 
not. 
In reality it appears that bank compliance has not prevented, or even moderated, the 
pervasiveness of the two balance sheet mismatches. This is largely because the banks 
kept on renewing their domestic and foreign currency loans, regardless of their 
maturities, with the expectation that they would have continuing access to global 
wholesale funding markets.  
This laxity in contingency planning for lining up liquidity in a crisis does not necessarily 
reflect a serious moral hazard on the part of Korean banks, because the past experience 
with the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis must have taught them that the government 
could not come to their aid in a crisis caused by low reserve currency liquidity. Instead, 
the laxity may have more to do with relationship banking and reflect the fact that 
compliance means the loss of competitiveness with regard to foreign competitors in 
global financial intermediation.  
If the regulatory restrictions prove to be ineffective, governments of emerging economies 
may invoke measures that are more direct such as providing government guarantees on 
foreign loans and imposing capital control. To restore foreign investor confidence, on 12 
October 2008 the Government of Korea issued sovereign guarantees on new foreign 
loans up to $100 billion maturing before the end of June 2009. Similar guarantees had 
failed to allay fears of financial meltdown at the beginning of the Asian financial crisis in 
1997, and they failed again; as in 1997, market participants simply ignored the 
guarantees. Foreign creditors simply do not believe in government promises when 
official reserves are inadequate to meet foreign debts coming due for repayment. 
As for direct control measures, there is an emerging consensus on the need to conduct 
reserve intervention and impose taxes and other restrictions on short-term capital 
inflows. Even the International Monetary Fund has softened its opposition to intervention 
in the foreign exchange market and imposing capital control (Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia, and 
Mauro 2010; Ostry et al. 2011). Whatever the benefits and costs of capital control and 
foreign exchange market intervention, national policy authorities would not refrain from 
invoking these measures if the volatility of the exchange rate rises to an excessive level 
and endangers stability of the domestic financial system as a result of volatile capital 
movements.
26
                                                 
26 Only when Korea secured a swap line of $30 billion from the US Federal Reserve on 30 October 2008 did 
the foreign exchange market settle down somewhat, although it was not for very long—the won-dollar 
exchange rate depreciated by more than 15% 3 weeks after the swap had been announced. The Federal 
Reserve’s liquidity support was apparently not enough to remove uncertainties surrounding Korea’s ability 
to service its foreign debt. Korea also secured local swap lines with the central banks of the People’s 
Republic of China and Japan, each amounting to an equivalent of $30 billion, on 13 December 2008. This 
additional support, together with the indication that the Federal Reserve would renew the swap 




6.2  A Global Liquidity Safety Net 
The US is largely free from currency mismatches because its currency—the dollar—is 
used for a high proportion of international banking business. Its central bank can always 
print more money to thwart any impending liquidity crisis caused by deterioration of 
maturity mismatches. As Shafer (1982) points out, the rise of international banking 
created a need for a lender of last resort in the euro currency markets. But central banks 
from the Group of 10 (G-10) countries could not agree on how to create such an 
institution in the 1970s, leading them to decide not to establish any rules and procedures 
for the provisioning of short-term liquidity (Turner 2009). During the 2008 economic crisis 
it was the four foreign central banks of Canada, Japan, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom, together with the European Central Bank, that had unlimited dollar swap lines 
with the Federal Reserve.  
Most central banks of emerging economies were given no such access. All this gives 
banks in advanced countries a competitive advantage in international financial 
intermediation. This means that, even during tranquil periods, the international monetary 
and financial systems do not provide a level playing field for emerging market economies 
in global finance. From their point of view, this bias, which is equivalent to a non-reserve 
currency discount, raises the issue of fairness and even questions the rationale of them 
integrating into the global financial system to the extent that it weakens their 
competitiveness. 
As argued in the preceding section, there are few effective measures emerging 
economies can take to prevent, and alleviate the consequences of, the currency 
mismatch. This limitation calls for multinational efforts at institutionalizing a global 
system of reserve currency liquidity support at both regional and global levels to be 
activated in a crisis situation when participating members suffer from short-term reserve 
currency liquidity shortages. The US dollar has been a de facto global currency and, as 
a distant second candidate, the euro has emerged as another reserve currency, 
although the recent euro crisis has cast doubt on its future in this role.  
As the providers of global media of exchange and stores of value, the reserve currency 
countries need to bear responsibility for controlling and stabilizing the global supply of 
liquidity. In assuming their global role, the Federal Reserve and European Central Bank 
may consider constructing a global currency swap network to supply liquidity in a crisis 
when banks and other financial institutions retreat from the market. 
The network membership could be enlarged to include, in addition to the current 
members, some of the emerging economies active in international financial markets to 
support them in case they need short-term US dollar or euro liquidity to prevent 
contagion of a liquidity crisis.
27
                                                                                                                                            
agreement, saw the confidence of foreign investors in the Korean economy improve, and stability in the 
foreign exchange market returned towards the end of the first quarter of 2009.  
 At the same time, the swap network could be 
complemented by new and additional credit facilities at the International Monetary Fund 
such as the flexible credit line (FCL) and expanding and consolidating regional liquidity 
27 There is concern that the expansion of the swap network could create moral hazard problems in emerging 
economies, but it is difficult to believe that emerging economies would be disposed to laxity in managing 
their macroeconomic policy simply because they have access to the swap lines.  ADBI Working Paper 284      Park                                       
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support arrangements such as the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization among 
ASEAN+3
28
7.  CONCLUDING REMARKS   
 member states.  
In the wake of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, there has been growing concern 
about the destabilization of the financial system in a low-inflation environment. One of 
the lessons of the great moderation is that price stability is not a sufficient condition for 
financial stability, although it remains true that sustained inflation encourages 
speculation, and abrupt decline in the rate of inflation could cause an increase in 
financial institution failures and significant financial stress throughout the economy.  
Monetary policy, as it is targeted to price stability, may not be an effective means to 
prevent a financial crisis or manage it better when it occurs. Fiscal policy is traditionally 
reserved for aggregate demand management. 
Harnessing financial stability therefore requires an additional instrument, and 
reorientation of microprudential regulations has been promoted as such a measure. This 
paper has examined the extent to which the regulatory tools, which are basically 
designed to safeguard soundness of individual financial institutions, could be 
implemented to moderate the boom–bust cycle in the real estate market by changing 
sector and aggregate volumes of bank credit. This paper argues that macroprudential 
policy operates through the bank credit channel, as does monetary policy, and its 
effectiveness is ambiguous. As far as the transmission mechanism is concerned, the two 
policies are one and the same.  
Traditionally, banks are specialized in asset transformation. As such they are exposed to 
maturity mismatches in their balance sheets and hence potentially to a liquidity crisis, 
which often provokes a bank run. In emerging economies, banks active in international 
financial intermediation are open to another risk that could undermine their soundness—
i.e., currency mismatch as they finance their local currency lending by borrowing in 
foreign currencies. Various regulatory restrictions may not be effective in preventing 
banks from committing the mismatch, because as long as banks are entrenched in long-
term relationship banking that systemizes the rollover of loans as a routine practice they 
find it difficult to comply with regulatory supervision. If these regulations are strictly 
enforced there is the danger that they could limit the scope of asset–liability 
management of banks and hence undermine their competitiveness in international 
financial intermediation with regard to their counterparts from advanced or reserve 
currency countries which are not subject to a similar constraint. 
When a sudden reversal in capital flows occurs, even well-regulated and sound banks in 
emerging economies are likely to be faced with solvency risk as they are denied access 
to external wholesale funding markets. This risk is one of the main reasons why many 
emerging economies hold excessive amounts of foreign exchange reserves and may 
need to intervene in the  foreign exchange market and impose capital control. Since 
holding large amounts of reserves is costly and could exacerbate global trade 
imbalances, constructing a global liquidity safety net that could meet the short-term 
reserve currency liquidity needs would serve as a more effective means of safeguarding 
against preventing reserve currency liquidity crises in emerging economies. 
                                                 
28 ASEAN+3 is the member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus the People’s 
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House Price (LHS) CPI (LHS) Stock Price (RHS)
 
Note: Consumer price index and house prices are measured on the left hand axis and stock price on the right. 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, Shanghai Stock Exchange 
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Source: Census and Statistics Department, Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the 
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Source: Bank Indonesia, Statistics Indonesia, Indonesia Stock Exchange 



























































































































































































House Price (LHS) CPI (LHS) Stock Price (RHS)
 
Note: Republic of Korea is here referred to by ‘Korea’ 
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Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 





























































































































































































House Price (LHS) CPI (LHS) Stock Price (RHS)
 




























































































































































































House Price (LHS) CPI (LHS) Stock Price (RHS)
 
Source: Bank of Thailand, Stock Exchange of Thailand 